Assessment of MCC Ops During the Power Loss Event of 7/17/97

From:
Sent: Monday, July 28, 1997 1:42 PM
To: ALGATE, ANDREW F. (JSC-DA8); AUSTIN, BRYAN P. (JSC-DA); BANTLE, JEFFREY W. (JSC-DA8); BRISCOE, ALAN L. (LEE) (JSC-DA); CASTLE, ROBERT E. (BOB) (JSC-DA8); DAVIS, SALLY P. (JSC-DA); DYE, PAUL F. (JSC-DA); FERRING, MARK J. (JSC-DA); HALE, N W., JR (WAYNE) (JSC-DA8); HAM, LINDA J. (JSC-DA8); HANLEY, JEFFREY M. (JEFF) (JSC-DA8); HILL, PAUL S. (JSC-DA8); KELSO, ROBERT M. (ROB) (JSC-DA); KIRASICH, MARK A. (JSC-DA); KWIATKOWSKI, THOMAS W. (TOM) (JSC-DA); PENNINGTON, GRANVIL A. (AL) (JSC-DA8); REEVES, WILLIAM D. (JSC-DA); SHANNON, JOHN P. (JSC-DA); SHAW, CHARLES W. (CHUCK) (JSC-DA8)
Subject: MCC-M Response

The above is a report I have drafted on the MCC-M response to the power loss incident which delayed the Mir EVA. It starts with what I think was a recoverable error (unplugging a key attitude sensor), but inaction by the ground allows the situation to deteriorate into a major problem. It is not completely clear from the information available, but it appears the ground may have even aggravated the situation with an incorrect quaternion uplink.

A classic example of the ground having their heads "up and locked"...

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